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Abstract
In this article, we study logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics.
We compare the relative expressivity of the two logics. It turns out that they are incomparable over
various classes of neighborhood models, and the combination of the two logics are equally expressive
as standard modal logic over any class of neighborhood models. We propose morphisms for each logic,
which can help us explore the frame definability problem, show a general soundness and completeness
result, and generalize some results in the literature. We axiomatize the two logics over various classes
of neighborhood frames. Last but not least, we extend the results to the case of public announcements,
which has good applications to Moore sentences and some others.
Keywords: unknown truths, false beliefs, accident, neighborhood semantics, morphisms, axiomatizations,
expressivity, frame definability, intersection semantics
1 Introduction
This paper studies logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics. Intuitively, if
p is true but you do not know that p, then you have an unknown truth that p; if p is false but you believe
that p, then you have a false belief that p, or you are wrong about p.
The notion of unknown truths is important in philosophy and formal epistemology. For instance, it is
related to Verificationism, or ‘verification thesis’ [31]. Verificationism says that all truths can be known.
However, from the thesis, the unknown truth of p, formalized p ∧ ¬Kp, gives us a consequence that
all truths are actually known. In other words, the notion gives rise to a well-known counterexample to
Verificationism. This is the so-called Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ [13].1 To take another example: it
gives rise to an important type of Moore sentences, which is essential to Moore’s paradox, which says that
one cannot claim the paradoxical sentence “p but I do not know it” [23, 18]. It is known that such a Moore
sentence is unsuccessful and self-refuting (see, e.g. [19, 32, 33]).2
In addition to the axiomatization for the logic of unknown truths on topological semantics [28], there
has been various work on the metaphysical counterpart of unknown truths — accidental truths, or simply,
‘accident’. The notion of accidental truths traces back at least to Leibniz, in the name of ‘ve´rite´s de fait’
(factual truths), see e.g. [1, 17]. This notion is related to problem of future contingents, which is formalized
by a negative form of accident [2]. Moreover, it is applied to reconstruct Go¨del’s ontological argument
(e.g. [26]), and also to provide an additional partial verification of the Boxdot Conjecture raised in [14]
(also see [30]).
The logical investigation on the notion of accidental truths is initiated by Marcos, who axiomatizes a
minimal logic of accident under relational semantics in [21], to differentiate ‘accident’ from ‘contingency’.3
The axiomatization is then simplified and its various extensions are presented in [27]. Symmetric accident
1For an excellent survey on Fitch’s paradox of knowability, we refer to [4].
2To say a formula ϕ is successful, if it still holds after being announced, in symbol  [ϕ]ϕ. Otherwise, we say this formula is
unsuccessful. Moreover, to say ϕ is self-refuting, if its negation always holds after being announced, in symbol  [ϕ]¬ϕ.
3As for a recent survey on (non)contingency logic, we refer to [11].
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logic is axiomatized in [6], and Euclidean accident logic is explored in [3].4 Some quite general soundness
and completeness results can be found in [16]. Some relative expressivity results are obtained in [21, 6].
In comparison, the notion of false beliefs is popular in the area of cognitive science, see e.g. [24, 34].
For technical reasons, [29] proposes a logic that has the operatorW as a sole modality. There,Wϕ is read
“the agent is wrong about ϕ”, and being wrong about ϕ means believing ϕ though ϕ is false. Complete
axiomatizations of the minimal logic of false belief and its various extensions are given, and some results
of frame definability are presented.
However, all this work are based on relational semantics. As the logics of unknown truths and false
beliefs are non-normal (due to the non-normality of their modalities), it is then natural and interesting to
investigate them from the perspective of neighborhood semantics.
Neighborhood semantics is independently proposed by Scott andMontague in 1970 [25, 22]. Since it is
introduced, neighborhood semantics has become a standard semantics for investigating non-normal modal
logics [5]. Partly inspired by [12], the authors of [15] proposes neighborhood semantics for logics of
unknown truths and false beliefs. According to the semantics, “it is an unknown truth that ϕ” is interpreted
as “ϕ is true and the proposition expressed by ϕ is not a neighborhood of the evaluated state”, and “it is
a false belief that ϕ” as “ϕ is false and the proposition expressed by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated
state”. Beyond some invariance and negative results, a minimal logic of unknown truths under relational
semantics, denoted BK there, is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the class of filters, and a
minimal logic of false beliefs under relational semantics, denoted AK therein, is shown to be sound and
complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames that are closed under binary intersections and
are negatively supplemented.
In this paper, in addition to explore the relative expressivity of logics of unknown truths and false
beliefs over various classes of neighborhood models, we also axiomatize logics of unknown truths and
false beliefs over various neighborhood frames. By defining notions of •-morphisms and W -morphisms,
we obtain good applications to, e.g. frame (un)definability, a general soundness and completeness result,
and some results that generalize those in [15] in a relative easy way. Moreover, we extend the results to the
case of public announcements: by adopting the intersection semantics in the literature (which is a kind of
neighborhood semantics for public announcements), we find suitable reduction axioms and thus complete
proof systems, which, again, gives us good applications to some interesting questions. For instance, are
Moore sentences self-refuting? How about the negation of Moore sentences? Are false beliefs of a fact
successful formulas? Other natural questions also result, for instance, are all unknown truths themselves
unknown truths? Are all false beliefs themselves are false beliefs?
As we will show in a proof-theoreticalway, interestingly, under fairly weak assumption (namely, mono-
tonicity), one’s false belief of a fact cannot be removed even after being told: if you have a false belief,
then after someone tells you this, you still have the false belief. In other words, false beliefs of facts are
all successful formulas. Different from the case in relational semantics, under neighborhood semantics,
Moore sentences are not self-refuting in general. But the negation of Moore sentences are successful in
the presence of monotonicity. Also, all unknown truths themselves unknown truths, but not all false beliefs
themselves are false beliefs, indeed, none of false beliefs themselves are false beliefs.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the languages and their neighbor-
hood semantics and some common neighborhood properties (Sec. 2), we compare the relative expressivity
of the languages in Sec. 3. Sec. 4 proposes notions of •-morphisms and W -morphisms and exploit their
applications. Sec. 5 axiomatizes the logics over various classes of neighborhood frames, which include
a general soundness and completeness result shown via the notion of W -morphisms. Sec. 6 extends the
previous results to the case of public announcements, where by using intersection semantics for public
announcements, we find suitable reduction axioms and complete axiomatizations, which gives us good
applications to Moore sentences and some others. We conclude with some future work in Sec. 7.
4In fact, [3] gave a complete axiomatization for strong noncontingency logic L(N) over the class of Euclidean frames, thereby
answering an open question posed in [10]. However, since as shown in [10], L(N) is equally expressive as accident logic over the
class of arbitrary models, thus one can translate the axiomatization of Euclidean strong noncontingency logic into an axiomatization
of Euclidean accident logic.
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2 Syntax and Semantics
Throughout this paper, we fix a nonempty set of propositional variables P and p ∈ P.
Definition 2.1. The languages involved in the current paper include the following.
L(•) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | •ϕ
L(W ) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ |Wϕ
L(•,W ) ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | •ϕ |Wϕ
L() ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ
L(•) is the language of the logic of unknown truths, L(W ) is the language of the logic of false beliefs,
L(•,W ) is the language of the logic of unknown truths and false beliefs, and L() is the language of
epistemic/doxastic logic.
Intuitively, •ϕ is read “it is an unknown truth that ϕ”, that is, “ϕ is true but unknown”,Wϕ is read “the
agent is wrong about ϕ”, or “it is a false belief that ϕ”, that is, “ϕ is false but believed”, and ϕ is read “it
is known/believed that ϕ”. Other connectives are defined as usual; in particular, ◦ϕ is abbreviated as ¬•ϕ,
read “it is known that ϕ once it is the case that ϕ”. In a philosophical context, •ϕ, ◦ϕ, and ϕ are read “it
is accident (or accidentally true) that ϕ”, “it is essential that ϕ”, and “it is necessary that ϕ”, respectively.
All the above-mentioned languages are interpreted over neighborhood models.
Definition 2.2. A (neighborhood) model is a triple M = 〈S,N, V 〉 such that, S is a nonempty set of
states (or called ‘possible worlds’),N is a neighborhood function from S to P(P(S)), and V is a valuation
function. Intuitively, X ∈ N(s) means that X is a neighborhood of s. For any neighborhood modelM
and state s in M, (M, s) is called a pointed (neighborhood) model. Without considering the valuation
function, we obtain a (neighborhood) frame.
Given a neighborhood modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉 and a state s ∈ S, the semantics of the aforementioned
languages is defined inductively as follows.
M, s  p ⇐⇒ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  •ϕ ⇐⇒ s ∈ ϕM and ϕM /∈ N(s)
M, s Wϕ ⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ϕM
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s)
Where ϕM = {s ∈M | M, s  ϕ}.
It is easily computed that
M, s  ◦ϕ ⇐⇒ s ∈ ϕM implies ϕM ∈ N(s).
Thus one may easily verify that  •ϕ↔ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), Wϕ↔ ϕ∧ ¬ϕ,  ◦ϕ↔ (ϕ→ ϕ), which
conform to the previous readings of •ϕ, Wϕ, ◦ϕ, respectively. This indicates that the modalities •,W , ◦
are all definable in the standard modal logic L(), and thereforeL() is at least as expressive as L(•) and
also L(W ) over any class of neighborhood models.
The neighborhood properties which we mainly focus on in this paper include the following.
Definition 2.3 (Neighborhood properties). Let F = 〈S,N〉 be a neighborhood frame, andM be a neigh-
borhood model based on F . For each s ∈ S andX,Y ⊆ S:
(m) N(s) is supplemented, or closed under supersets, if X ∈ N(s) and X ⊆ Y implies Y ∈ N(s). In
this case, we also say thatN(s) is monotone.
(c) N(s) is closed under (binary) intersections, ifX ∈ N(s) and Y ∈ N(s) impliesX ∩ Y ∈ N(s).
(n) N(s) contains the unit, if S ∈ N(s).
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(r) N(s) contains its core, if
⋂
N(s) ∈ N(s).
The function N possesses such a property, if N(s) has the property for all s ∈ S; F has a property, if
N has. Frame F is a filter, if F has (m), (c) and (n); F is augmented, if F has (m) and (r). ModelM
has a property, if F has such a property.
It is known that every augmented model is a filter, but not vice versa (see e.g. [5]).
3 Expressivity
This part compares the relative expressivity of L(•) and L(W ). To begin with, we give the definition of
expressivity.
Definition 3.1 (Expressivity). LetL1 and L2 be two logical languages that are interpreted in the same class
M of models,
• L2 is at least as expressive as L1, notation: L1  L2, if for each formula ϕ in L1, there exists a
formula ψ in L2 such that for each modelM inM, for each state s inM, we have thatM, s  ϕ iff
M, s  ψ.
• L1 is less expressive than L2, notation: L1 ≺ L2, if L1  L2 and L2 6 L1.
• L1 and L2 are equally expressive, if L1  L2 and L2  L1.
• L1 and L2 are incomparable (in expressivity), if L1 6 L2 and L2 6 L1.
The following two propositions state that the languages L(•) and L(W ) are incomparable over any
model classes with the above neighborhood properties.
Proposition 3.2. On the class of all models, the (m)-models, the (c)-models, the (n)-models, the (r)-
models, L(•) is not at least as expressive as L(W ).
Proof. Consider the following models, where the only difference is N ′(s) = N(s) ∪ {{t}}, and an arrow
from a state x to a set X means thatX is a neighborhood of x:
{t}
M s : ¬p // {s, t} t : poo M′ s : ¬p //
55❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦
{s, t} t : poo
It may be easily checked that bothM andM′ have (m), (c), (n) and (r).
Moreover, (M, s) and (M′, s) can be distinguished by an L(W )-formula: on the one hand, as pM =
{t} /∈ N(s), we haveM, s 2 Wp; on the other hand, sinceM′, s 2 p and pM
′
= {t} ∈ N ′(s), we infer
thatM, s Wp.
However, these two pointed models cannot be distinguished by any L(•)-formulas. For this, we show
a stronger result that for all ϕ ∈ L(•), for all x ∈ S,M, x  ϕ iffM′, x  ϕ, that is, ϕM = ϕM
′
. As the
two models differs only in the neighborhood of s, it suffices to show thatM, s  ϕ iffM′, s  ϕ, that is,
s ∈ ϕM iff s ∈ ϕM
′
. The proof goes with induction on ϕ, where the only case to treat is •ϕ.
To begin with, suppose that M, s  •ϕ, then s ∈ ϕM and ϕM /∈ N(s). By induction hypothesis,
s ∈ ϕM
′
and ϕM
′
/∈ N(s). Since s ∈ ϕM
′
, it must be the case that ϕM
′
6= {t}, that is, ϕM
′
/∈ {{t}},
and thus ϕM
′
/∈ N(s) ∪ {{t}} = N ′(s). Therefore,M′, s  •ϕ.
Conversely, assume that M′, s  •ϕ, then s ∈ ϕM
′
and ϕM
′
/∈ N ′(s). As N(s) ⊆ N ′(s), by
induction hypothesis, we infer that s ∈ ϕM and ϕM /∈ N(s). Therefore,M, s  •ϕ.
Therefore, L(W ) 6 L(•).
Proposition 3.3. On the class of all models, the (m)-models, the (c)-models, (n)-models, the (r)-models,
L(W ) is not at least as expressive as L(•).
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Proof. Consider the following models, where the only difference is thatN ′(s) = N(s) ∪ {{s}}:
{s}
M s : p // {s, t} t : ¬poo M′ s : p //
OO
{s, t} t : ¬poo
One may check thatM andM′ both have (m), (c), (n) and (r).
One the one hand, (M, s) and (M′, s) can be distinguished by an L(•)-formula, just noticing that
M, s  •p (asM, s  p but pM = {s} /∈ N(s)) andM′, s 2 •p (since pM
′
= {s} ∈ N ′(s)).
On the other hand, (M, s) and (M′, s) cannot be distinguished by any L(W )-formulas. For this, we
prove a stronger result that for all ϕ ∈ L(W ), for all x ∈ S,M, x  ϕ iffM′, x  ϕ, that is, ϕM = ϕM
′
.
As the two models differs only in the neighborhood of s, it is sufficient to demonstrate thatM, s  ϕ iff
M′, s  ϕ. The proof continues with induction on ϕ, in which the only case to fix isWϕ.
First, suppose thatM, s  Wϕ, then ϕM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ϕM. Since N(s) ⊆ N ′(s), by induction
hypothesis, we can obtain that ϕM
′
∈ N ′(s) and s /∈ ϕM
′
, and thusM′, s Wϕ.
For the other direction, assume thatM′, s  Wϕ, then ϕM
′
∈ N ′(s) and s /∈ ϕM
′
. As s /∈ ϕM
′
, it
must be the case that ϕM
′
6= {s}, that is, ϕM
′
/∈ {{s}}. Thus ϕM
′
∈ N(s). By induction hypothesis, we
infer that ϕM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ϕM, thereforeM, s Wϕ.
Therefore, L(•) 6 L(W ).
The following result follows immediately from Prop. 3.2 and Prop. 3.3.
Corollary 3.4. On the class of all models, the (m)-models, the (c)-models, the (n)-models, the (r)-models,
L(•) and L(W ) are incomparable, and thus both logics are less expressive than L(•,W ).
The result below states that L(•,W ) is equally expressive as L() over any class of neighborhood
models. This extends the result in [9], where it is shown that the two logics are equally expressive over any
class of relational models.
Proposition 3.5. L(•,W ) is equally expressive as L() on any class of neighborhood models.
Proof. Since  •ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ and Wϕ↔ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, we have L(•,W )  L().
Moreover, we demonstrate that  ϕ↔ Wϕ ∨ (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ), as follows. Given any neighborhood model
M = 〈S,N, V 〉 and s ∈ S, we have the following equivalences:
M, s Wϕ ∨ (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ)
⇐⇒ M, s Wϕ orM, s  ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ
⇐⇒ (ϕM ∈ N(s) andM, s 2 ϕ) or (M, s  ◦ϕ andM, s  ϕ)
⇐⇒ (ϕM ∈ N(s) andM, s 2 ϕ) or ((M, s  ϕ implies ϕM ∈ N(s)) andM, s  ϕ)
⇐⇒ (ϕM ∈ N(s) andM, s 2 ϕ) or (M, s  ϕ and ϕM ∈ N(s))
⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s)
⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ.
This implies that L()  L(•,W ), and therefore L(•,W ) is equally expressive as L() on any class
of neighborhood models.
4 Morphisms and their applications
This section proposes notions of morphisms for L(•) and L(W ), and some of their applications.
4.1 •-morphisms
Definition 4.1 (•-Morphisms). LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be neighborhood models. A
function f : S → S′ is a •-morphism fromM toM′, if for all s ∈ S,
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(Var) s ∈ V (p) iff f(s) ∈ V (p) for all p ∈ P;
(•-Mor) for all X ⊆ S, [s ∈ X andX /∈ N(s)]⇐⇒ [f(s) ∈ f [X ] and f [X ] /∈ N ′(f(s))].
We say thatM′ is a •-morphic image ofM, if there is a surjective •-morphism fromM toM′.
The following result indicates that the formulas of L(•) are invariant under •-morphisms.
Proposition 4.2. Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be neighborhood models, and let f be a
•-morphism fromM toM′. Then for all s ∈ S, for all ϕ ∈ L(•), we haveM, s  ϕ⇐⇒M′, f(s)  ϕ,
that is, f [ϕM] = ϕM
′
.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The nontrivial case is •ϕ.
Suppose thatM, s  •ϕ, to show thatM′, f(s)  •ϕ. By supposition, s ∈ ϕM and ϕM /∈ N(s). By
(•-Mor), we have that f(s) ∈ f [ϕM] and f [ϕM] /∈ N ′(f(s)). By induction hypothesis, this means that
f(s) ∈ ϕM
′
and ϕM
′
/∈ N ′(f(s)). ThusM′, f(s)  •ϕ.
Conversely, assume thatM′, f(s)  •ϕ, to prove thatM, s  •ϕ. By assumption, f(s) ∈ ϕM
′
and
ϕM
′
/∈ N ′(f(s)). By induction hypothesis, this entails that f(s) ∈ f [ϕM] and f [ϕM] /∈ N ′(f(s)). By
(•-Mor) again, we obtain that s ∈ ϕM and ϕM /∈ N(s). Therefore,M, s  •ϕ.
The notion of •-morphisms can be applied to the following result in a relative easy way. Note thatMt
+
andMt
−
defined on [15, p. 254] are, respectively, the special cases ofMt
+
andMt
−
defined below when
Γw = Sw. Thus our result below is an extension of [15, Thm. 1.10].
Proposition 4.3. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉. For each w ∈ S and α ∈ L(•), we have
M, w  α iffMt
+
, w  α
and
M, w  α iffMt
−
, w  α,
where Mt
+
= 〈S,N t
+
, V 〉 and Mt
−
= 〈S,N t
−
, V 〉, where N t
+
(w) = N(w) ∪ Γw and N t
−
(w) =
N(w)\Γw, in which Γw ⊆ Sw = {X ⊆ S | w /∈ X}.
Proof. By Prop. 4.2, it is sufficient to show that f : S → S such that f(x) = x is a •-morphism fromM
toMt
+
, and also a •-morphism fromM toMt
−
.
The condition (Var) is clear. For (Mor), we need to show that
[w ∈ X andX /∈ N(w)]⇐⇒ [w ∈ X andX /∈ N t
+
(w)] (1)
and
[w ∈ X andX /∈ N(w)]⇐⇒ [w ∈ X andX /∈ N t
−
(w)] (2).
The “⇐=” of (1) and “=⇒” of (2) follows directly from the fact thatN t
−
(w) ⊆ N(w) ⊆ N t
+
(w).
Moreover, given w ∈ X , according to the definition of Sw, we have X /∈ Sw, thus X /∈ Γw. This
follows that “=⇒” of (1) and “⇐=” of (2).
Note that in the above proposition, as Γw is defined in terms of w, thus given any two points x, y ∈ S,
Γx may be different from Γy . This point will be used frequently in the proofs below.
Now coming back to Prop. 3.2, instead of directly proving that L(•)-formulas cannot distinguish be-
tween (M, s) and (M′, s), we can resort to Prop. 4.3, by just noticing thatM′ =Mt
+
where Γs = {{t}}
and Γt = ∅.5
With Prop. 4.3, we immediately have the following corollary, which extends the result in [15, Coro. 1.11].
5Note that Γs is an arbitrary subset of Ss, and {t} ∈ Ss (as s /∈ {t}), we thus can set Γs = {{t}}. Similar arguments apply for
Γt and other similar definitions of Γs and Γt in other situations below.
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Corollary 4.4. Let F = 〈S,N〉, and F t
+
= 〈S,N t
+
〉 and F t
−
= 〈S,N t
−
〉 be defined as in Prop. 4.3.
Then for all ϕ ∈ L(•), we have
F  ϕ iff F t
+
 ϕ
and
F  ϕ iff F t
−
 ϕ.
It turns out that this corollary is quite useful in exploring the problem of frame (un)definability of L(•).
A frame property P is said to be definable in a language L, if there exists a set Θ of formulas in L such
that F  Θ iff F has P . When Θ = {ϕ}, we write simply ϕ rather than {ϕ}.
To demonstrate the undefinability of a frame property P in a language L, we (only) need to construct
two frames such that one of them has P but the other fails, and any L-formula is valid on one frame if and
only if it is also valid on the other. The argument is as follows: were P defined by a set of L-formulas Θ,
we would derive that F  Θ iff F has P . As any L-formula is valid on one frame if and only if it is also
valid on the other, this also applies to the set Θ. This implies that one frame has P iff the other also has,
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 4.5. The frame properties (c) and (r) are undefinable in L(•).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
{s} {t} {s} {t}
F s
OO 77♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣
t
OOgg◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆
F ′ s
OO 77♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦ // ∅ t
OOgg❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖
oo
From the above figure, we can see that F ′ possesses (c) and (r) but F does not, since {s} ∈ N(s) and
{t} ∈ N(s) but {s} ∩ {t} = ∅ /∈ N(s).
Moreover, one may easily verify that F ′ = F t
+
in which Γs = Γt = {∅}, then by Coro. 4.4, we obtain
that for all ϕ ∈ L(•), we have F  ϕ iff F ′  ϕ.
Proposition 4.6. The frame property (m) is undefinable in L(•).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
{s} {s} ∅
F s
OO
// {s, t} too F ′ s
OO
66♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠ // {s, t} too
One may check that F possesses (m) whereas F ′ does not, since ∅ ∈ N ′(s) but {t} /∈ N ′(s) although
∅ ⊆ {t}.
Besides, F ′ = F t
+
where Γs = {∅} and Γt = ∅. Then by Coro. 4.4, we derive that F  ϕ iff F ′  ϕ
for all ϕ ∈ L(•).
Although the properties of (m), (c) and (r) are undefinable in L(•), the property (n) is definable in
the language. This can be explained via Coro. 4.4 as follows: since for all w inM = 〈S,N, V 〉, w must
be in S, thus it must be the case that S /∈ Γw, and this makes a suitable definition of Γw in showing the
undefinability as in Props. 4.5 and 4.6 unavailable.
Proposition 4.7. The frame property (n) is definable in L(•).
Proof. We show that (n) is defined by ◦⊤. Let F = 〈S,N〉.
Suppose that F has (n), to show that F  ◦⊤. For this, for any model M based on F and s ∈ S,
we need to show that M, s  ◦⊤, which amounts to showing that S ∈ N(s) (because M, s  ⊤ and
⊤M = S). And S ∈ N(s) is immediate by supposition.
Conversely, assume that F does not have (n), then there exists s ∈ S such that S /∈ N(s), that is,
⊤M /∈ N(s). We have alsoM, s  ⊤, and thusM, s 2 ◦⊤, therefore F 2 ◦⊤.
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4.2 W -morphisms
Definition 4.8 (W -morphisms). LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be neighborhood models. A
function f : S → S′ is aW -morphism fromM toM′, if for all s ∈ S,
(Var) s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ P;
(W -Mor) for all X ⊆ S, [X ∈ N(s) and s /∈ X ]⇐⇒ [f [X ] ∈ N ′(f(s)) and f(s) /∈ f [X ]].
We say thatM′ is aW -morphic image ofM, if there is a surjectiveW -morphism fromM toM′.
Proposition 4.9. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be neighborhoodmodels, and let f be aW -
morphism fromM toM′. Then for all s ∈ S, for all ϕ ∈ L(W ), we haveM, s  ϕ⇐⇒M′, f(s)  ϕ,
that is, f [ϕM] = ϕM
′
.
Proof. By induction on ϕ, where the only nontrivial case isWϕ.
Suppose thatM, s  Wϕ, to show thatM′, f(s)  Wϕ. By supposition, ϕM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ϕM.
By (W -Mor), f [ϕM] ∈ N ′(f(s)) and f(s) /∈ f [ϕM]. By induction hypothesis, we infer that ϕM
′
∈
N ′(f(s)) and f(s) /∈ ϕM
′
, and thusM′, f(s) Wϕ.
Conversely, assume thatM′, f(s) Wϕ, to prove thatM, s Wϕ. By assumption,ϕM
′
∈ N ′(f(s))
and f(s) /∈ ϕM
′
. By induction hypothesis, we derive that f [ϕM] ∈ N ′(f(s)) and f(s) /∈ f [ϕM]. Then
by (W -Mor) again, we get ϕM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ϕM, and thereforeM, s Wϕ.
The modelsMu
+
andMu
−
defined in [15, p. 262] are, respectively, the special cases of those defined
in the following proposition, when Σw = Uw. Therefore, the following proposition extends the result
in [15, Thm. 2.8].
Proposition 4.10. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉. For all w ∈ S and α ∈ L(W ), we have
M, w  α iffMu
+
, w  α
and
M, w  α iffMu
−
, w  α,
whereMu
+
= 〈S,Nu
+
, V 〉 andMu
−
= 〈S,Nu
−
, V 〉, where Nu
+
(w) = N(w) ∪ Σw and Nu
−
(w) =
N(w)\Σw for Σw ⊆ Uw = {X ⊆ S | w ∈ X}.
Proof. By Prop. 4.9, it suffices to show that f : S → S such that f(x) = x is aW -morphism fromM to
Mu
+
, and also aW -morphism fromM toMu
−
.
The condition (Var) is clear. For (W -Mor), we only need to show that
[X ∈ N(w) and w /∈ X ]⇐⇒ [X ∈ Nu
+
(w) and w /∈ X ] (1)
and
[X ∈ N(w) and w /∈ X ]⇐⇒ [X ∈ Nu
−
(w) and w /∈ X ] (2).
The “=⇒” of (1) and “⇐=” of (2) are straightforward since Nu
−
(w) ⊆ N(w) ⊆ Nu
+
(w).
Moreover, if w /∈ X , thenX /∈ Uw, thus X /∈ Σw. This gives us “⇐=” of (1) and “=⇒” of (2).
Similar to the case in Prop. 4.3, here Σw is defined in terms of w, thus given any two points x, y ∈ S,
Σx may be different from Σy .
Now coming back to Prop. 3.3, without showing directly L(W )-formulas cannot distinguish between
(M, s) and (M′, s′), we can appeal to Prop. 4.10, by noting that M′ = Mu
+
where Σs = {{s}} and
Σt = {{s, t}}.6 Prop. 4.10 will be also useful in proving a general completeness result (see Thm. 5.29).
With Prop. 4.10, we have immediately the following, which extends the result in [15, Coro. 2.9].
6Note that since Σs is an arbitrary subset of Us, and {s} ∈ Us (as s ∈ {s}), then we can set Σs = {{s}}. Similar arguments
also holds for Σt and other definitions of Σs and Σt in other situations below.
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Corollary 4.11. Let F = 〈S,N〉, and Fu
+
= 〈S,Nu
+
〉 andFu
−
= 〈S,Nu
−
〉 be defined as in Prop. 4.10.
Then for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), we have
F  ϕ iff Fu
+
 ϕ
and
F  ϕ iff Fu
−
 ϕ.
Similar to Coro. 4.4, Coro. 4.11 can also be applied to proving the results of frame (un)definability in
L(W ).
Proposition 4.12. The frame properties (m) and (n) are undefinable in L(W ).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
F s // ∅ F ′ {s} s //oo ∅
One may check that F ′ has (m) and (n), but F does not, since ∅ ∈ N(s) but {s} /∈ N(s) although
∅ ⊆ {s}.
Moreover, F ′ = Fu
+
where Σs = {{s}}. Then by Coro. 4.11, we conclude that for all ϕ ∈ L(W ),
F  ϕ⇐⇒ F ′  ϕ.
Proposition 4.13. The frame properties (c) and (r) are undefinable in L(W ).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
{t} {s} {t}
F s //
66♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠ {s, t} too
OO
F ′ s //
OO
66❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧ {s, t} too
OO
Onemay check thatF has (c) and (r), butF ′ fails, since {s} ∈ N ′(s) and {t} ∈ N ′(s) but {s}∩{t} =
∅ /∈ N ′(s).
Moreover, F ′ = Fu
+
where Σs = {{s}} and Σt = {{s, t}}. Then by Coro. 4.11, we conclude that
for all ϕ ∈ L(W ), F  ϕ⇐⇒ F ′  ϕ.
We conclude this part with another application of the notion ofW -morphisms. For this, we define the
notion of transitive closure of a neighborhood frame, which comes from [15, Def. 2.12].
Definition 4.14. Given a neighborhood frameF = 〈S,N〉, we define its transitive closureF tc = 〈S,N tc〉
inductively as
⋃
i∈N Fi, with F0 = F and Fi+1 = 〈S,Ni+1〉, where
Ni+1(w) = Ni(w) ∪ {mNi(X) | X ∈ Ni(w)}
for every w ∈ S, and
mNi(X) = {z ∈ S | X ∈ Ni(z)}
forX ⊆ S.
Fact 4.15. [15, Fact 2.13] For all w ∈ S, if X ∈ N tc(w)\N(w), then w ∈ X .
The following proposition is shown in [15, Thm. 2.14], but without use of a morphism argument. Here
we give a much easier proof via the notion ofW -morphisms.
Proposition 4.16. Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a model based on a frame F andMtc the corresponding one
based on F tc. For all w ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L(W ), we have
M, w  ϕ iffMtc, w  ϕ.
Proof. We show a stronger result: f : S → S such that f(x) = x is a W -morphism from M to Mtc.
which implies the statement due to Prop. 4.9. The condition (Var) is straightforward.
For (W -Mor), we need to show that
[X ∈ N(x) and x /∈ X ]⇐⇒ [X ∈ N tc(x) and x /∈ X ].
The ‘=⇒’ follows immediately sinceN(x) ⊆ N tc(x). For the other direction, ifX ∈ N tc(x) and x /∈
X , by Fact 4.15, we obtain thatX ∈ N(x), as desired.
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5 Axiomatizations
We now axiomatize L(•) and L(W ) over various neighborhood frames.
5.1 Axiomatizations for L(•)
The following lists the axioms and inference rules that are needed in this part.
Axioms Rules
PL All instances of propositional tautologies
◦E •ϕ→ ϕ MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
◦M ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ)
◦C ◦ϕ ∧ ◦ψ → ◦(ϕ ∧ ψ) RE◦
ϕ↔ ψ
◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ
◦N ◦⊤
All axioms and inference rules arise in the literature, with distinct names, except for ◦M, which is
derivable from axiom (K1.2) in [21], that is, ((ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ◦ψ)) → ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ). Rather, a stronger rule
ϕ→ ψ
(◦ϕ ∧ ϕ)→ (◦ψ ∧ ψ)
(denoted RM◦), has usually been used to replace axiom ◦M (see e.g. [27, 16, 15]).
But we prefer axioms to rules of inference. As we will see below, given RE◦ (and propositional calculus),
the rule RM◦ is also derivable from ◦M.
Proposition 5.1. RM◦ is derivable from PL+ MP+ ◦M+ RE◦.
Proof. We have the following proof sequences in PL+ MP+ ◦M+ RE◦:
(1) ϕ→ ψ Premise
(2) ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ψ (1),PL,MP
(3) ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ ◦ψ (2),RE◦
(4) ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ) ◦M
(5) ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦ψ (3), (4)
(6) (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ)→ (◦ψ ∧ ψ) (1), (5)
If we consider all axioms and rules above, we obtain a logic called BK in [27, 16, 15].
7
BK is the
minimal logic for L(◦) over relational semantics, that is, it is sound and strongly complete with respect to
the class of all relational frames [27]. As each Kripke model is pointwise equivalent to some augmented
model, BK is also (sound and) strongly complete with respect to the class of augmented frames [15].
Moreover, since every augmentedmodel is a filter, thusBK also characterizes the class of filters. From now
on, for the sake of consistency on notation, we denote the logic by K◦ here. As neighborhood semantics
can handle logics weaker than the minimal relational logic, it is then natural to ask what logics weaker than
K
◦ look like. Here is a table that summarizes K◦ and its weaker logics and the corresponding classes of
7More precisely, the system BK contains the rule RM◦ instead of the axiom ◦M, and skips the rule RE◦ since it is then derivable
from RM◦ and ◦E (see [16, Prop. 3.2]).
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frames which determine them.8
Proof systems Frame classes
E
◦ = PL+ MP+ ◦E+ RE◦ —
M
◦ = E◦ + ◦M (m)
EC
◦ = E◦ + ◦C (c)
EN
◦ = E◦ + ◦N (n)
EMC
◦ = M◦ + ◦C (mc)
EMN
◦ = M◦ + ◦N (mn)
ECN
◦ = EC◦ + ◦N (cn)
K
◦ = EMC◦ + ◦N filters = (mcn)
A natural question is: are all unknown truths themselves unknown truths? Interestingly, in monotone
logics, the answer is positive. We now give a proof-theoretical perspective.
Proposition 5.2. •ϕ→ • • ϕ is provable inM◦.
Proof. Notice that we have the following proof sequences inM◦.
(i) •ϕ→ ϕ ◦E
(ii) ◦ • ϕ ∧ •ϕ→ ◦ϕ (i),RM◦
(iii) ◦ • ϕ→ ◦ϕ (ii),PL
(iv) •ϕ→ • • ϕ (iii),PL
We now focus on the completeness of the proof systems in the above table. The completeness proof is
based on the construction of the canonical model. From now on, we define the proof set of ϕ in a system
Λ, denoted |ϕ|Λ, as the set of maximal consistent sets of Λ that contains ϕ; in symbol, |ϕ|Λ = {s ∈ Sc |
ϕ ∈ s}. We skip the subscript and simply write |ϕ| whenever the system Λ is clear. If a set of states Γ is
not a proof set in Λ for any formula, then we say it is a non-proof set relative to Λ.
Definition 5.3. The canonical model for E◦ is the tripleMc = 〈Sc, N c, V c〉, where
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of E◦},
• N c(s) = {|ϕ| | ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s},
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
Lemma 5.4. For all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(•), we haveMc, s  ϕ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s, that is, ϕM
c
= |ϕ|.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The nontrivial case is •ϕ, that is, we only need to show that Mc, s  •ϕ iff
•ϕ ∈ s.
First, suppose that •ϕ ∈ s, to prove thatMc, s  •ϕ, which by induction hypothesis is equivalent to
showing that ϕ ∈ s and |ϕ| /∈ N c(s). By supposition and axiom ◦E, we infer that ϕ ∈ s. As •ϕ ∈ s, we
have ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ /∈ s, and then |ϕ| /∈ N c(s) according to the definition of N c.
Conversely, suppose that •ϕ /∈ s, to show thatMc, s 2 •ϕ. Assume thatMc, s  ϕ, viz., s ∈ ϕM
c
,
then by induction hypothesis, s ∈ |ϕ|, namely, ϕ ∈ s. By supposition, we infer that ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s. Then
from the definition of N c, it follows that |ϕ| ∈ N c(s). Now by induction hypothesis again, we conclude
that ϕM
c
∈ N c(s). Therefore,Mc, s 2 •ϕ.
We also need to show thatN c is well-defined.
Lemma 5.5. If |ϕ| ∈ N c(s) and |ϕ| = |ψ|, then ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s.
8It is worth remarking that ◦E is indispensable in any proof system in the table. To see this, define a new semantics which interprets
all formulas of the form ◦ϕ as ϕ (so that •ϕ is interpreted as ¬ϕ), then one can see that under the new semantics, ◦E is not valid,
but any subsystem L − ◦E of L in the table is sound. This entails that ◦E is not derivable in any such subsystem, and thus ◦E is
indispensable in any proof system in the table.
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Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ N c(s) and |ϕ| = |ψ|, to show that ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s. By supposition, we obtain
◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s and ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ. By RE◦, it follows that ⊢ ◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ. Therefore, ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s.
Now it is a routine work to show the following.
Theorem 5.6. E◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all neighborhood frames.
Theorem 5.7. EC◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (c)-frames.
Proof. For soundness, we need to show the validity of ◦C over the class of (c)-frames. For this, letM =
〈S,N, V 〉 be a (c)-model, s ∈ S, and suppose that M, s  ◦ϕ ∧ ◦ψ, to show that M, s  ◦(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Assume that s ∈ (ϕ ∧ ψ)M, it suffices to show that (ϕ ∧ ψ)M ∈ N(s). By supposition, it follows that
s ∈ ϕM implies ϕM ∈ N(s), and s ∈ ψM implies ψM ∈ N(s). By assumption, s ∈ ϕM and s ∈ ψM,
and thus ϕM ∈ N(s) and ψM ∈ N(s). An application of (c) gives us ϕM ∩ ψM ∈ N(s), that is,
(ϕ ∧ ψ)M ∈ N(s), as desired.
For completeness, define Mc w.r.t. EC◦ as in Def. 5.3. It suffices to show that N c is closed under
conjunctions. For this, let s ∈ Sc be arbitrary, and suppose that X ∈ N c(s) and Y ∈ N c(s), to show that
X ∩ Y ∈ N c(s). By supposition, there are ϕ, ψ such that X = |ϕ| ∈ N c(s) and Y = |ψ| ∈ N c(s), then
◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s and ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s. From this and axiom ◦C, it follows that ◦(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ s, and thus
|ϕ ∧ ψ| ∈ N c(s), viz. X ∩ Y ∈ N c(s).
Theorem 5.8. EN◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (n)-frames.
Proof. The soundness follows directly from the soundness ofE◦ (Thm. 5.6) and the validity of ◦N (Prop. 4.7).
For the completeness, define Mc w.r.t. EN◦ as in Def. 5.3. It suffices to show that for all s ∈ Sc,
Sc ∈ N c(s). This follows immediately from the axiom ◦⊤ ∧ ⊤ ∈ s and the fact that |⊤| = Sc.
The following is a consequence of Thm. 5.7 and Thm. 5.8.
Corollary 5.9. ECN◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (cn)-frames.
Now we deal with the completeness of M◦. As in the case of monotone modal logic, the canonical
neighborhood function N c is not necessarily supplemented due to the presence of non-proof sets. To deal
with this problem, we use the strategy of supplementation.
Definition 5.10. Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a neighborhood model. We say that M+ = 〈S,N+, V 〉 is the
supplementation ofM, if for all s ∈ S, N+(s) = {X | Y ⊆ X for some Y ∈ N(s)}.
Given any neighborhood model, its supplementation is supplemented. Also, N(s) ⊆ N+(s) for all
s ∈ S. Moreover, the supplementation preserves the properties (c) and (n).
Fact 5.11. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a neighborhood frame. IfM has (c), then so doesM+; ifM has (n),
then so doesM+.
Proof. Suppose thatM has (c). Let s ∈ S andX,X ′ ⊆ S, if X,X ′ ∈ N+(s), then Y ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ X ′
for some Y, Y ′ ∈ N(s), thus Y ∩ Y ′ ⊆ X ∩X ′. From Y, Y ′ ∈ N(s) and the supposition, it follows that
Y ∩ Y ′ ∈ N(s). Therefore,X ∩X ′ ∈ N+(s). This means thatM+ has also (c).
Assume thatM has (n). Then S ∈ N(s) for all s ∈ S. Since N(s) ⊆ N+(s), thus S ∈ N+(s) for all
s ∈ S. This entails thatM+ has also (n).
Theorem 5.12. M◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (m)-frames.
Proof. For soundness, by the soundness of E◦ (Thm. 5.6), it suffices to show that the axiom ◦M preserves
validity over (m)-frames.
Suppose for any (m)-modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉 and s ∈ S that M, s  ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ, to prove that M, s 
◦(ϕ ∨ ψ). By supposition, we obtain that s ∈ ϕM and ϕM ∈ N(s). Since ϕM ⊆ ϕM ∪ ψM, by (m), it
follows that (ϕ ∨ ψ)M ∈ N(s), and thereforeM, s  ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ).
For completeness, defineMc w.r.t. M◦ as in Def. 5.3, and consider the supplementation ofMc, that
is, (Mc)+ = 〈Sc, (N c)+, V c〉. By definition of supplementation, (Mc)+ possesses (m).
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It suffices to show that for all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(◦),
|ϕ| ∈ (N c)+(s)⇐⇒ ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s.
“⇐=” follows directly from the fact thatN c(s) ⊆ (N c)+(s).
For “=⇒”, suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (N c)+(s), thenX ⊆ |ϕ| for someX ∈ N c(s). SinceX ∈ N c(s), there
must be a χ such that |χ| = X ∈ N c(s), and then ◦χ ∧ χ ∈ s. We have also |χ| ⊆ |ϕ|, then ⊢ χ → ϕ.
Note that the rule RM◦ is derivable inM◦ (Prop. 5.1), thus we have ⊢ ◦χ ∧ χ→ ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ, thus ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s,
as desired.
Theorem 5.13. EMC◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (mc)-frames.
Proof. The soundness follows directly from the soundness of M◦ (Thm. 5.12) and the validity of ◦C
(Thm. 5.7).
As for the completeness, define Mc and (Mc)+ w.r.t. EMC◦ as in Thm. 5.12. By Thm. 5.12, it
suffices to show that (Mc)+ possesses (c). This follows immediately from Thm. 5.7 and Fact 5.11.
Theorem 5.14. EMN◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (mn)-frames.
Proof. The soundness follows directly from the soundness of M◦ (Thm. 5.12) and the validity of ◦N
(Prop. 4.7).
As for the completeness, define Mc and (Mc)+ w.r.t. EMN◦ as in Thm. 5.12. By Thm. 5.12, it
suffices to show that (Mc)+ possesses (n). This follows immediately from Thm. 5.8 and Fact 5.11.
Theorem 5.15. K◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of filters.
Proof. The soundness follows immediately from that ofEMN◦ (Thm. 5.14) and the validity of ◦C (Thm. 5.7).
As for the completeness, defineMc and (Mc)+ w.r.t. K◦ as in Thm. 5.14. By Thm. 5.14, it suffices
to show that (Mc)+ has (c). This follows from Thm. 5.7 and Fact 5.11.9
5.2 Axiomatizations for L(W )
To axiomatize L(W ) over various neighborhood frames, we list the following axioms and rules of infer-
ence.
Axioms Rules
PL All instances of propositional tautologies
WE Wϕ→ ¬ϕ MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
WM W (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ → Wψ
WC Wϕ ∧Wψ →W (ϕ ∧ ψ) REW
ϕ↔ ψ
Wϕ↔Wψ
Similar to the axiomatizations for L(•), all axioms and inference rules listed above also arise in the
literature, with different names. The axiom WM is derivable from a rule
ϕ→ ψ
(Wϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→Wψ
(see [29,
Thm. 3.2]), denoted RMW, which has usually been used to replace WM [29, 15]. Again, we prefer axioms to
inference rules. Also, note that the rule RMW is derivable from the axiom WM in the presence of REW (and
propositional calculus).
Proposition 5.16. RMW is derivable from PL+ MP+ WM+ REW.
9Note that there was a mistake in [15, Thm. 1.8], where the authors did not prove that (Mc)+ (denoted M+ there) has (c)
and (n); rather, they only show thatMc (denotedM there) does have, which though does not directly give us the completeness in
question.
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Proof. We have the following proof sequences in PL+ MP+ WM+ REW.
(1) ϕ→ ψ Premise
(2) ϕ ∧ ψ ↔ ϕ (1),PL,MP
(3) W (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔Wϕ (2),REW
(4) W (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ →Wψ WM
(5) (Wϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→Wψ (3), (4)
It is shown that the proof system consisting of all axioms and inference rules for L(W ), denotedKW
here, is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all relational frames in [29] and to the class
of all neighborhood frames that are closed under intersections and are negatively supplemented in [15].10
We will give the definition of ‘negatively supplemented’ later. Again, it is natural to ask what logics weaker
thanKW look like. Below is a table summarizingKW and its weaker logics and the corresponding frame
classes that determine them.
Proof systems Frame classes
E
W = PL+ MP+ WE+ REW —, also (n)
M
W = EW + WM (m), also (mn)
EC
W = EW + WC (c), also (cn)
K
W = MW + WC (mc), also filters = (mcn)
Note that WE is indispensable in KW and its weaker systems in the above table. To see this, consider
an auxiliary semantics which interprets all formulas of the formWϕ as ϕ, then one may easily verify that
the subsystemKW − WE is sound with respect to the auxiliary semantics, but WE is unsound, and thus WE
cannot be derived from the remaining axioms and inference rules. This entails that WE is indispensable in
K
W, and thus WE is indispensable in the weaker systems ofKW.
We can also ask the following question: are all false beliefs themselves false beliefs? Different from the
notion of unknown truths, the answer to this question is negative. In fact, none of false beliefs themselves
are false beliefs. We now give a proof-theoretical perspective for this.
Proposition 5.17. Wϕ→ ¬WWϕ is derivable in EW.
Proof. We have the following proof sequences:
(i) WWϕ→ ¬Wϕ WE
(ii) Wϕ→ ¬WWϕ (i),PL
In the reminder of this section, we focus on the completeness of the four proof systems listed above,
with the aid of canonical neighborhood model constructions. Unfortunately, all these systems may not be
handled by a uniform canonical neighborhood function; rather, we need to distinguish systems excluding
axiom WM from those including it. This is similar to the case of neighborhood contingency logics [8].
5.2.1 Systems excluding WM
Definition 5.18. Let L be a system excluding WM. A tupleML = 〈SL, NL, V L〉 is the canonical neigh-
borhood model for L, if
• SL = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of L},
• NL(s) = {|ϕ| |Wϕ ∈ s},
• V L(p) = {s ∈ SL | p ∈ s}.
10More precisely, the system in [29] (called SW there) and [15] (called AK there) contains the rule RMW instead of the axiom WM,
and drops the rule REW since it is then derivable from RMW and WE (see [29, Thm. 3.1]).
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The neighborhood functionNL is well defined.
Lemma 5.19. Let L be a system excluding WM. If |ϕ| = |ψ| and |ϕ| ∈ NL(s), thenWψ ∈ s.
Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| = |ψ| and |ϕ| ∈ NL(s), to prove that Wψ ∈ s. By supposition, ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ and
Wϕ ∈ s. By REW, we have ⊢Wϕ↔Wψ, and thusWψ ∈ s.
Lemma 5.20. Let L be a system excluding WM. For all ϕ ∈ L(W ), for all s ∈ SL, we have ML, s 
ϕ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s, that is, ϕM
L
= |ϕ|.
Proof. By induction on ϕ, where the nontrivial case isWϕ.
Suppose that Wϕ ∈ s, to show that ML, s  Wϕ. By supposition and axiom WE, we derive that
¬ϕ ∈ s, viz., ϕ /∈ s, then by IH, we obtainML, s 2 ϕ. It suffices to show that ϕM
L
∈ NL(s), which is
equivalent to showing that |ϕ| ∈ NL(s) by IH. This follows directly from the fact thatWϕ ∈ s.
Conversely, suppose thatML, s  Wϕ, to prove thatWϕ ∈ s. By supposition and IH, |ϕ| ∈ NL(s)
and ϕ /∈ s. This immediately gives usWϕ ∈ s.
Now it is a standard work to show the following.
Theorem 5.21. EW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all neighborhood frames.
Proposition 5.22. ECW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (c)-frames.
Proof. For the soundness, by Thm. 5.21, it suffices to show the validity of WC. For this, letM = 〈S,N, V 〉
and s ∈ S such thatM, s  Wϕ ∧Wψ. Then ϕM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ϕM, and ψM ∈ N(s) and s /∈ ψM.
From ϕM ∈ N(s) and ψM ∈ N(s) and (c), it follows that ϕM∩ψM ∈ N(s), that is, (ϕ∧ψ)M ∈ N(s);
from s /∈ ϕM it follows that s /∈ (ϕ ∧ ψ)M. Therefore,M, s W (ϕ ∧ ψ).
For the completeness, by Thm. 5.21, it is sufficient to prove thatNL has the property (c). Suppose that
X ∈ NL(s) and Y ∈ NL(s), then there are ϕ, ψ such that X = |ϕ| and Y = |ψ|. From |ϕ| ∈ NL(s)
and |ψ| ∈ NL(s), it follows that Wϕ ∈ s and Wψ ∈ s. By axiom WC, we obtain W (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ s, thus
|ϕ ∧ ψ| ∈ NL(s), namelyX ∩ Y ∈ NL(s).
5.2.2 Systems including WM
To deal with the completeness of the systems includingWM, we need to redefine the canonical neighborhood
function. The reason is as follows. If we continue using the canonical neighborhood function in Def. 5.18
and the strategy of supplementation (like the case in monotone modal logics), then we also need a rule
ϕ→ ψ
Wϕ→Wψ
in the systems. However, this rule is not sound, as one may easily check.
The following canonical neighborhood function is found to satisfy the requirement.
Definition 5.23. Let L be a system including WM. A tripleML = 〈SL, NL, V L〉 is a canonical neighbor-
hood model for L, if
• SL = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of L},
• |ϕ| ∈ NL(s) iffWϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s,
• V L(p) = {s ∈ SL | p ∈ s}.
The reader may ask why we do not use this definition for systems excluding WM. This is because it does
not work for system ECW (Thm. 5.22), as one may check.
Note that Def. 5.23 does not specify the function NL completely; in addition to the proof sets that
satisfy this definition,NL may also contain non-proof sets relative to L. Therefore, each of such logics has
many canonical neighborhood models.
We need also show thatNL is well defined.
Lemma 5.24. Let L be a system including WM. If |ϕ| = |ψ| and |ϕ| ∈ NL(s), thenWψ ∨ ψ ∈ s.
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Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| = |ψ| and |ϕ| ∈ NL(s), to prove thatWψ ∨ ψ ∈ s. By supposition, ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ
andWϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s. By REW, we have ⊢Wϕ↔Wψ, and thusWψ ∨ ψ ∈ s.
Lemma 5.25. LetML be a canonical neighborhood model for any system extending MW. Then for all
ϕ ∈ L(W ), for all s ∈ SL, we haveML, s  ϕ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s, that is, ϕM
L
= |ϕ|.
Proof. By induction on ϕ, where the nontrivial case isWϕ.
Suppose that Wϕ ∈ s, to show that ML, s  Wϕ. By supposition and axiom WE, we derive that
¬ϕ ∈ s, viz., ϕ /∈ s, then by IH, we obtainML, s 2 ϕ. It suffices to show that ϕM
L
∈ NL(s), which is
equivalent to showing that |ϕ| ∈ NL(s) by IH. This follows directly from the fact thatWϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s.
Conversely, suppose thatML, s  Wϕ, to prove thatWϕ ∈ s. By supposition and IH, |ϕ| ∈ NL(s)
and ϕ /∈ s, which implies thatWϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s. Therefore,Wϕ ∈ s.
Given any system L extending MW, the minimal canonical neighborhood model for L, denoted
MLmin = 〈S
L, NLmin, V
L〉, is defined such that NLmin(s) = {|ϕ| | Wϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s}. Similar to the cases in
monotone modal logic and M◦, due to the existence of non-proof sets, the canonical neighborhood func-
tion NLmin is not necessarily supplemented. So again, we use the strategy of supplementation. The notion
of supplementation can be found in Def. 5.10.
Theorem 5.26. MW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (m)-frames.
Proof. For the soundness, by Thm. 5.21, it remains to show the validity of WM. For this, letM = 〈S,N, V 〉
be an (m)-model and s ∈ S.
Suppose that M, s  W (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ, to demonstrate that M, s  Wψ. By supposition, we have
(ϕ ∧ ψ)M ∈ N(s), that is to say, ϕM ∩ ψM ∈ N(s). Since s ∈ (¬ψ)M, we have s /∈ ψM. By (m), we
derive that ψM ∈ N(s). Therefore,M, s Wψ.
For the completeness, define the supplementation of MLmin and denote it (M
L
min)
+. By definition
of supplementation, (MLmin)
+ possesses (m). Thus the remainder is to prove that (MLmin)
+ is indeed a
canonical neighborhood model forMW. That is, for every s ∈ Sc, for every ϕ ∈ L(W ), we have
|ϕ| ∈ (NLmin)
+(s)⇐⇒Wϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s.
The proof is as follows.
‘⇐=’: This follows immediately from the fact thatNLmin(s) ⊆ (N
L
min)
+(s).
‘=⇒’: Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (NLmin)
+(s), then there exists X ∈ NLmin(s) such that X ⊆ |ϕ|. Since
X ∈ NLmin(s), there must be a χ such that X = |χ|. By |χ| ∈ N
L
min(s), we have Wχ ∨ χ ∈ s. From
|χ| ⊆ |ϕ| it follows that ⊢ χ → ϕ. Note that the rule RMW is derivable in MW (Prop. 5.16). Thus an
application of RMW gives us ⊢ Wχ ∧ ¬ϕ → Wϕ, that is, ⊢ Wχ → Wϕ ∨ ϕ. From ⊢ χ → ϕ it also
follows that ⊢ χ→Wϕ∨ϕ, and then ⊢Wχ∨χ→Wϕ∨ϕ, and thereforeWϕ∨ϕ ∈ s, as required.
It is shown in [15, Thm. 2.2, Coro. 2.7] that KW (denoted AK there) is sound and complete with
respect to the class of all neighborhood frames that are closed under binary intersections and are negatively
supplemented, where a neighborhood frame F = 〈S,N〉 is said to be negatively supplemented if for all
s ∈ S andX,Y ⊆ S, ifX ∈ N(s),X ⊆ Y and s /∈ Y , then Y ∈ N(s). Notice that the notion of negative
supplementation is weaker than that of supplementation.11 We have seen thatMW characterizes the class
of neighborhood frames that are supplemented. Thus it is quite natural to ask which logic characterizes the
class of neighborhood frames that are negative supplemented. As we will see, MW does this job as well.
Corollary 5.27. MW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames
that are negatively supplemented.
Proof. The proof of the soundness is the same as in Thm. 5.26, by replacing (m) with the property of
‘negative supplementation’.
The completeness also follows from Thm. 5.26, since negative supplementation is weaker than supple-
mentation.
11For us, ‘weakly supplemented’ seems a better term than ‘negatively supplemented’, partly because the notion is indeed weaker
than supplementation, and partly because it is not actually to negate supplementation; rather, it only adds a negative condition to the
property of supplementation.
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We have the following conjecture. Note that the soundness is straightforward. In the current stage we
do not know how to prove the completeness, because if we define (MLmin)
+ w.r.t. KW as in Thm. 5.26, by
Thm. 5.26, it suffices to prove that (NLmin)
+ has (c), which follows directly by Fact 5.11 ifNLmin possesses
(c). But to show NLmin possesses (c), we again encounter the problem which is remarked immediately
behind Def. 5.23.12
Conjecture 5.28. KW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of filters, and also to the
class of (mc)-frames.
We close this section with a general soundness and completeness result. For those systems L including
WM, as ⊤ ∈ s, thus W⊤ ∨ ⊤ ∈ s, and hence SL = |⊤| ∈ NLmin(s), then by Fact 5.11, we obtain that
SL ∈ (NLmin)
+(s), which means that (MLmin)
+ possesses (n).
However, for those systems L excluding WM, as W⊤ /∈ s (by axiom W1), by Def. 5.18, we infer that
SL = |⊤| /∈ NL(s). Thus the canonical modelML for such systems L does not have (n). We can handle
this problem with Prop. 4.10. The following general completeness result is a corollary of Prop. 4.10. Note
that the following result also holds for systems including WM.
Theorem 5.29. Let L be a system of L(W ). If L is determined by a certain class of neighborhood frames,
then it is also determined by the class of neighborhood frames satisfying (n).
Proof. Suppose that L is determined by a certain class C of neighborhood frames, to show that L is sound
and strongly complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames satisfying (n). The soundness is
clear, since the class of neighborhood frames satisfying (n) is contained in C.
For the completeness, by supposition, every L-consistent set, say Γ, is satisfiable in a model based on
the frame in C. That is, there exists a modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉 where 〈S,N〉 ∈ C and a state s ∈ S such
thatM, s  Γ. Now, applying Prop. 4.10, we obtain thatMu
+
, s  Γ forMu
+
= 〈S,Nu
+
, V 〉, where
Nu
+
(s) = N(s) ∪ {S}. Note that the definition of Nu
+
is well defined, since in Prop. 4.10, Σs is an
arbitrary subset of Us and S ∈ Us (as s ∈ S) thus {S} ⊆ Us, we can define Σs to be {S}. Moreover,
Mu
+
possesses (n). Also, (n) does not broken the previous properties. Therefore, Γ is also satisfiable in
a neighborhood model satisfying (n).
Corollary 5.30. The following soundness and completeness results hold:
1. EW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (n)-frames;
2. MW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (mn)-frames;
3. ECW is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (cn)-frames.
6 Adding public announcements
Now we extend the previous results to the dynamic case: public announcements. Syntactically, we add
the construct [ϕ]ϕ into the previous languages, where the formula [ψ]ϕ is read “ϕ is the case after each
truthfully public announcement of ψ”. Semantically, we adopt the intersection semantics proposed in [20].
In details, given a monotone neighborhoodmodelM = 〈S,N, V 〉 and a state s ∈ S,
M, s  [ψ]ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s  ψ impliesM∩ψ, s  ϕ
whereM∩ψ is the intersection submodelM∩ψ
M
, and the notion of intersection submodels is defined as
below.
Definition 6.1. [20, Def. 3] LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a monotone neighborhoodmodel, andX is a nonempty
subset of S. Define the intersection submodelM∩X = 〈X,N∩X , V X〉 induced fromX , where
12Note that we can prove the completeness based on the completeness of KW w.r.t. the class of relational frames. Since it is
shown that KW is complete with respect to the class of relational frames [29], and each relational model has a pointwise equivalent
augmented model (the proof is similar to the case in standard modal logic), and each augmented model is a filter, thus KW is
complete with respect to the class of filters, and hence also complete with respect to the class of (mc)-frames.
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• N∩X(s) = {P ∩X | P ∈ N(s)} for every s ∈ X ,
• V X(p) = V (p) ∩X for every p ∈ P.
Proposition 6.2. [20, Prop. 2] The frame property (m) is preserved under taking the intersection submodel.
That is, ifM is a monotone neighborhoodmodel with the domain S, then for anyX ⊆ S, the intersection
submodelM∩X is also monotone.
We obtain the following reduction axioms for L(•,W ) and its sublanguages L(•), L(W ).
AP [ψ]p↔ (ψ → p) AA [ψ][χ]ϕ↔ [ψ ∧ [ψ]χ]ϕ
AN [ψ]¬ϕ↔ (ψ → ¬[ψ]ϕ) A• [ψ] • ϕ↔ (ψ → •[ψ]ϕ)
AC [ψ](ϕ ∧ χ)↔ ([ψ]ϕ ∧ [ψ]χ) AW [ψ]Wϕ↔ (ψ →W [ψ]ϕ)
From the reduction axioms, we can see that, every formula of L(•,W ) (and thus its sublanguages) with
public announcement operators can be rewritten as a formulawithout public announcements via finite many
of steps. Thus the addition of public announcements does not increase the expressivity of the languages in
question. Moreover,
Theorem 6.3. Let Λ be a system of L(•) (resp. L(W ), L(•,W )). If Λ is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of monotone neighborhood frames, then so is Λ plus AP, AN, AC, AA and A• (resp.
plus AP, AN, AC, AA and AW, plus AP, AN, AC, AA, A• and AW) under intersection semantics.
Proof. We only need to show the validity of A• and AW. The proof for the validity of other reduction axioms
can be found in [20, Thm. 1]. This then will give us the soundness. Moreover, the completeness can be
shown via a standard reduction method, see [33]. Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be any monotone neighborhood
model and s ∈ S.
For A•:
Suppose thatM, s  [ψ] • ϕ andM, s  ψ, to show thatM, s  •[ψ]ϕ, that is to showM, s  [ψ]ϕ
and ([ψ]ϕ)M /∈ N(s). By supposition, we haveM∩ψ, s  •ϕ, thenM∩ψ, s  ϕ and ϕM
∩ψ
/∈ N∩ψ(s).
FromM∩ψ, s  ϕ it follows thatM, s  [ψ]ϕ. We have also ([ψ]ϕ)M /∈ N(s): if not, namely ([ψ]ϕ)M ∈
N(s), then ([ψ]ϕ)M ∩ ψM ∈ N∩ψ(s). Since ([ψ]ϕ)M ∩ ψM ⊆ ϕM
∩ψ
, by (m), we derive that ϕM
∩ψ
∈
N∩ψ(s): a contradiction.
Conversely, assume that M, s  ψ → •[ψ]ϕ, to prove that M, s  [ψ] • ϕ. For this, suppose that
M, s  ψ, it remains to show that M∩ψ, s  •ϕ, equivalently, M∩ψ, s  ϕ and ϕM
∩ψ
/∈ N∩ψ(s).
By assumption and supposition, we obtain thatM, s  •[ψ]ϕ, thenM, s  [ψ]ϕ and ([ψ]ϕ)M /∈ N(s).
FromM, s  [ψ]ϕ andM, s  ψ, it follows thatM∩ψ, s  ϕ. Moreover, ϕM
∩ψ
/∈ N∩ψ(s): otherwise,
ϕM
∩ψ
= P ∩ ψM for some P ∈ N(s), and then P ⊆ (S\ψM) ∪ ϕM
∩ψ
, and thus by (m), we infer that
(S\ψM) ∪ ϕM
∩ψ
∈ N(s), that is, ([ψ]ϕ)M ∈ N(s): a contradiction.
Now for AW:
Suppose thatM, s  [ψ]Wϕ andM, s  ψ, to show thatM, s  W [ψ]ϕ, that is to show ([ψ]ϕ)M ∈
N(s) and M, s 2 [ψ]ϕ. By supposition, we derive that M∩ψ, s  Wϕ, that is, ϕM
∩ψ
∈ N∩ψ(s) and
M∩ψ, s 2 ϕ. From ϕM
∩ψ
∈ N∩ψ(s), it follows that ϕM
∩ψ
= P ∩ ψM for some P ∈ N(s), and then
P ⊆ (S\ψM) ∪ ϕM
∩ψ
. By (m), we get (S\ψM) ∪ ϕM
∩ψ
∈ N(s), that is, ([ψ]ϕ)M ∈ N(s). Moreover,
fromM, s  ψ andM∩ψ, s 2 ϕ, it follows immediately thatM, s 2 [ψ]ϕ.
Conversely, assume that M, s  ψ → W [ψ]ϕ, to prove that M, s  [ψ]Wϕ. For this, suppose
that M, s  ψ, it suffices to demonstrate that M∩ψ, s  Wϕ, which means that ϕM
∩ψ
∈ N∩ψ(s)
and M∩ψ, s 2 ϕ. By assumption and supposition, we derive that M, s  W [ψ]ϕ. This entails that
([ψ]ϕ)M ∈ N(s) andM, s 2 [ψ]ϕ. From ([ψ]ϕ)M ∈ N(s) it follows that ([ψ]ϕ)M ∩ ψM ∈ N∩ψ(s).
As ([ψ]ϕ)M ∩ ψM ⊆ ϕM
∩ψ
, by (m), we gain ϕM
∩ψ
∈ N∩ψ(s). Besides, fromM, s 2 [ψ]ϕ, it follows
directly thatM∩ψ, s 2 ϕ, as desired.
For the sake of simplicity, we use M◦[·] for the system that consists of M◦ plus the above reduction
axioms involving •, and MW[·] for the system that consists of MW plus the above reduction axioms
involvingW .
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It is shown in [7, Prop. 38] that Moore sentences are unsuccessful and self-refuting, that is, [•p]¬ • p is
provable inK•[·] (namely, the minimal Kripke logic of L(•) plus the above reduction axioms involving •).
However, this does not apply to the monotone case.
Proposition 6.4. [•p]¬ • p is not provable in M◦[·].
Proof. We have the following proof sequences:
[•p]¬ • p ↔ (•p→ ¬[•p] • p) AN
↔ (•p→ ¬(•p→ •[•p]p)) A•
↔ (•p→ ¬(•p→ •(•p→ p))) AP
↔ (•p→ ¬ • (•p→ p)) PL
Thus we only need to show the unprovability of •p→ ¬ • (•p → p) in M◦. By completeness ofM◦,
it remains to show that this formula is not valid over the class of (m)-frames. To see this, just consider an
(m)-modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉, where S = {s}, N(s) = ∅, and V (p) = {s}. It is easy to see thatM, s  p
and pM /∈ N(s), thus M, s  •p. Moreover, M, s  •p → p and (•p → p)M /∈ N(s), and hence
M, s  •(•p → p), and thereforeM, s 2 •p→ ¬ • (•p→ p). Also,M possesses (m). This establishes
the required result.
One may show that [•p]¬•p is provable inEN◦ plus the reduction axioms for • operator, since inEN◦,
•p → ¬ • (•p → p) is provable, whose proof is similar as in [7, Prop. 38] (note that ◦⊤ is interderivable
with the rule
ϕ
◦ϕ
in the presence of the rule RE◦).
Similar to the case in the minimal Kripke logic for L(•), in M◦[·], the negations of Moore sentences
are all successful formulas.
Proposition 6.5. [¬ • p]¬ • p is provable inM◦[·].
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [7, Prop. 39] except that we are now in the much weaker system. In
this system, we have the following proof sequences:
[¬ • p]¬ • p ↔ (¬ • p→ ¬[¬ • p] • p) AN
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬(¬ • p→ •[¬ • p]p)) A•
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬(¬ • p→ •(¬ • p→ p))) AP
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬ • (¬ • p→ p)) PL
↔ (◦p→ ◦(◦p→ p)) Def. of ◦
Notice that ◦p → ◦(◦p → p) is provable in M◦. First, as ⊢ p → (◦p → p), by rule RM◦ (Prop. 5.1),
⊢ ◦p ∧ p → ◦(◦p → p). Moreover, ⊢ ◦p ∧ ¬p → ◦(◦p → p): to see this, we consider its contraposition,
that is, •(◦p→ p)→ (◦p→ p), which is just an instance of axiom ◦E.
Interestingly, public announcements cannot change one’s false belief about a fact. More precisely, if
you have a false belief about p and someone responds with “you are wrong about p”, then you still have
the false belief.
Proposition 6.6. [Wp]Wp is provable in MW[·].
Proof. We observe the following proof sequences:
[Wp]Wp ↔ (Wp→W [Wp]p) AW
↔ (Wp→W (Wp→ p)) AP
Moreover,Wp→W (Wp→ p) is provable inMW. To see this, note that ⊢ p→ (Wp→ p), then by
rule RMW (Prop. 5.16), we derive that ⊢Wp∧¬(Wp→ p)→W (Wp→ p), that is, ⊢Wp∧Wp∧¬p→
W (Wp→ p). Now by WE, we obtain that ⊢Wp→W (Wp→ p).
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7 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we investigated logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics.
More precisely, we compared the relative expressivity of the two logics, proposed notions of •-morphisms
and W -morphisms with applications to frame definability, a general soundness and completeness result
and some related results in the literature in a relative easy way, and axiomatized the two logics over various
neighborhood frames, and finally, we extended the results to the case of public announcements, where by
adopting the intersection semantics we found suitable reduction axioms and thus complete proof systems,
which again has good applications to Moore sentence and some others.
An interesting question is to explore the notions of bisimulations for logics of unknown truths and false
beliefs, for which notions of •-morphisms andW -morphisms might give us some inspirations. Moreover,
a related research direction would be neighborhood bimodal logics with contingency and accident.
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